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"Crack Me If You Can" - DEFCON 2012
 
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InsidePro Team 2012

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Active Members 20
Names / Nicks Admin, blazer, bvv, c0d3inj3cT, dda, Frank89, gscp, h0wler, jnpe, mastercracker, Mastermind, mr.2x, n00bster, POLIMO, proinside, raspberry, test0815, Tyra, usasoft, User
Software EGB, Passwords Pro, *Hashcat*, John the Ripper, cRARk, AOPR, ARPR, ULM
Hardware ~250 CPU cores and 9 GPUs - see individual member writeups

Introduction

We would like to begin by giving a big thanks to Korelogic for once again putting a tremendous effort in organizing the "Crack Me If you can" contest at Defcon 20, we're sure it wasn't an easy feat. In addition, we would like to thank "Kaiser" our representative at Defcon 20 and of course every team who participated. While we "Team InsidePro 2012" only placed third, scoring a little over 2 million points, we would like to acknowledge and congratulate our rivals "Team Hashcat" and "John-Users" for their marvelous effort in placing first and second place respectively, both scoring in excess of 3 million points.

This year was a little different as some of the rules were revised and more challenges were added, in addition these challenges were worth an exorbitant amount of points. While we understand these new rules were put in place to give smaller teams a chance to win side prizes, we must admit this dazed us a little as we were unsure whether solving already solved challenges would give us points or whether it was a "first come first serve" basis. This caused a bit of confusion as we debated whether to solve the harder unsolved challenges or easier already solved challenges and therefore ignored them completely during the early stages of the contest until things were confirmed.

Our team

Our team this year comprised of roughly 20 members geographically scattered around the world with members from (Russia, Australia, United States of America, Canada, Switzerland, France, Italy, Portugal and Germany). The software and hardware which we used is shown in Table 1.

GPU Count  CPU Count  Software
Radeon 7970 8   AMD Athlon 64 X2 1   EGB
Radeon 5770 2   AMD Phenom 9500 1   PasswordsPro
Radeon 6950 1   AMD Phenom 9550 1   HashcatPlus
Radeon 5850 3   AMD Phenom X6 1055T 1   John the Ripper
Radeon 5750 3   Intel Core i5 2500k 3    
Nvidia GTX 470 1   Intel Core i5 750 1   cRARk
Nvidia GTX 460 2   Intel Core i7 2600k 4   UZC
Nvidia GTX 260 1   Intel Core i7 2600QM1   AOPR
Nvidia GTX 250 3   Intel Core i7 620M (MBP)1  ARPR
Nvidia GTX 550Ti 1   Intel Core2Duo Q66001    
     Intel Core2Duo Q94002   Hashcat Utils
     Intel Pentium E5200 1   ULM
     Intel Xeon 5130 2    
     Intel Xeon 5365 2    
Table 1. A rough list of our hardware and software capabilities. Note: Not all software/hardware listed was used continuously throughout the 48 hour period.

Approach

As usual, we took the more relaxed approach and once again adopted the free-for-all tactic. This allowed each member to attack whatever hash type they preferred, the results would then be collated, parsed and then submitted. We, as a team, decided that it would be best to initially recover as many passwords as possible, analyze the passwords and look for patterns and perhaps `fingerprinting' them for our secondary attack.

The Game

Unlike other teams which appeared to have raced for the challenges, we largely ignored them until several hours into the contest when different solutions to the challenges were submitted and we realized from the stats page that there were actually points being credited for solved challenges.

We noticed some of hashes required reformatting to make them compatible with EGB, ppro and the hashcats and this was carried out swiftly by various team members. We were surprised with the new addition of sunMD5 and dynamic 21, but we did our best to recover hashes from these algorithms.

After many hours of different attacks we saw certain patterns emerge and these included the use of lists from Swiss Cities, Greek Names, other patterns included but not limited to are; pure numeric, dates and strange dates, some heavy passwords reuse such as `password' and `dealtime' in their permuted forms to name a few. The team then started to run various attacks with a focus on these lists in an attempt to exploit these patterns. While this technique worked, we realized it was not ideal to perform on the extremely resource intensive algorithms such as Blowfish, mscache2, md5(APR) etc. In addition from our `cracks' we could not see a clear pattern in these slow algorithms besides them being common words. It was only late on day 1 towards day 2 that we had some significant breaks for tougher algorithms and also DES(Unix).

Through the competition, we largely remained within the top 3 positions, mainly trading places with "Team Hashcat" and "John-users". While we expected other teams to hang on to batches of high scoring hashes as a safety net, our general team consensus was that we would submit everything we had. This worked quite well, as it baited other teams to show their true colors, making them submit what they had to remain top dog... or cat.

Towards the end of the contest, we were really in bind, we realized there were only 2 ways to be able to obtain a good score 1) Focus only on the toughest algorithms or 2) Attempt to score the bonuses from cracking as many hashes as possible for the various easier algorithms. In order to boost our score our team had to alter our carefree approach and instead we all focused solely on the tougher algorithms.

Breakthroughs

DES(UNIX)

We noticed a fair few passwords were blocks of sentences and phrases, meaning bruteforce attacks would be futile on the hashes. We instead gathered text which fit this profile and applied the following `recipe' on them to produce some nice working lists which we could just use for direct dictionary attacks.

An example of what we used for DES(Unix):
  1. Input slab of text/wordlist
  2. Substring out text with minimum length 8+
  3. Line Tools > Remove if line only contains > Digits
  4. Downsize > Save if length is 8
  5. Sort > Sort and Remove duplicates
Blowfish

Several members noticed that dinosaurs were a common theme in the passwords we recovered and some of the toughest algorithms contained a couple of hits with this property. All efforts were then directed towards hitting these algorithms namely Blowfish with these wordlists.

MD5 crypt, MD5 APR

Many of the passwords which were cracked appeared to be lower alpha varying from 8 to 10 characters long. In addition, there were many passwords with the titled property (First Character Upper, Lower case rest)

Some rough statistics from our teams' password haul

Our team recovered passwords with lengths exceeding 20 characters (not shown). Figure 1. suggests that a large proportion of passwords that we were able to recovered were predominantly length 9. Figure 2. shows that we were able to recover large portions of the lower-space and mixed-alpha space styled passwords.


Figure 1: Length of the recovered passwords cracked by Team InsidePro (truncated to length 15)



Figure 2: istribution of the recovered passwords by character set, cracked by Team InsidePro (partial)


Reflection, comments and suggestions

In contrast to some of the larger teams we were probably under geared, coupled with our carefree approach, this seriously put us at a disadvantage as we weren't using our hardware efficiently. While we should work on our team dynamics better, the important thing is that it was a great challenge and it was a pleasure to participate once again.

We expected the passwords to resemble more of a password leak, however they appeared to be more methodically generated. This is understandable, as there is only so much variation that can be used before all mangling rules are exhausted. We will have to reconsider both our approach and our attack methodology to better suit this sort of password selection.

Our major downfall would be the fact that we, unlike John-Users, didn't focus on the higher scoring algorithms enough. However despite our 3rd place in overall points, our team was able to crack the second highest number of hashes, suggesting that the problem was attributed to execution rather than the technique we used in recovering the passwords.

We would like to thank Korelogic for the addition of new challenge types which made it very interesting, we would also look forward to WPA/WPA2 hashshakes, if that was thrown into the mix. We largely agree with the weighting of the points for the different algorithms. However, while we understand that DCC2 can be accelerated with GPU, we believe it deserves a higher scoring value due to its computing requirements.

Some team members have suggested to move the contest to the weekend (Saturday/Sunday), as we had a fair few late comers in our team this year. We do understand though, that there are many people participating from all over the world in different time-zones making it impossible to cater for everyone. Another suggestion would be to issue personalized certificate / diploma for all team members of the top 3 teams. It could have a couple of logos like Defcon, Korelogic, etc. and state the team member name, the team name and the ranking.

While we acknowledge these issues may have had little or no effect on our team, we would like to voice some minor complaints about the contest. For starters the rules of the contest should be better clarified, as stated previously we were confused with how the scoring of the challenges worked. Additionally we expected the release of the PGP password to be delivered through email rather than on the website. It also appeared that the hash bonus was modified from 100k to 50k during the contest as we kept a close eye on the stats page.

Once again we would like to thank Korelogic for organizing 'Crack me if you can'. We would also like to thank those who have read up to this point in our write-up. If you have further questions or any queries, do not hesitate to join us in a discussion at http://forum.insidepro.com.










 
 

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